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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION’S 
CHALLENGES AND ALASKA 
NATIVES’ CULTURAL PROPERTY 
STUART SCHÜSSEL* 
INTRODUCTION 
There is something immediately distinctive about the Northwest 
Coast Barbie. While she shares the same impossible physique and high 
heels common to Mattel’s iconic product line, the Northwest Coast 
Barbie sports a dark complexion, and her black hair falls onto an earthy, 
patterned “Chilkat blanket.”1 The box identifies this particular Barbie as 
a member of the Tlingit; a brief description of the Tlingit follows.2 
 This doll illustrates just one way in which Americans are familiar 
with Alaska Native art and imagery, even if they have never been to 
Alaska and do not know any Alaska Natives. The significance of some 
items, like totem poles, is common knowledge. A hawk designed in the 
artistic style native to the Pacific Northwest serves as the logo for the 
Seattle Seahawks. Trinkets and souvenirs in Alaska Native styles are 
regularly purchased by the thousands of tourists who visit Alaska each 
year.  
 Beyond its popular appeal, Alaska Native art enjoys attention from 
academics and art collectors. Museums around the country hold large 
collections of Alaskan art; the Smithsonian’s National Museum of the 
American Indian boasts over a thousand Alaska Native objects.3 Alaskan 
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 1.  Liz Ruskin, “Tlingit Barbie, but Barbie Nonetheless,” MILWAUKEE 
JOURNAL SENTINEL, Mar. 8, 2000, at 12B (“Her long, synthetic hair cascades over 
the fuzzy Chilkat blanket . . . . “). 
 2.  For a picture of Northwest Coast Barbie and the text on the 
accompanying packaging, see Northwest Coast Native American Barbie Doll, BARBIE 
COLLECTOR, http://www.barbiecollector.com/shop/doll/northwest-coast-
native-american-barbie-doll-24671 (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). 
 3.  See, e.g., Collections and Research, NAT’L MUSEUM OF THE AMERICAN 
INDIAN, http://www.americanindian.si.edu/searchcollections/results.aspx? 
catids =0&place=alaska&src=1-3 (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (displaying thumbnail 
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art also features prominently in Native American art auctions, with a 
Tlingit rattle fetching $625,000 last year at Christie’s.4  
Given the popularity and economic importance of Alaskan arts and 
crafts, Alaska Native communities would benefit from the use and sale 
of their cultural property. Additionally, like other indigenous peoples, 
Alaska Natives seek to block the use of images and objects with sacred 
and religious significance. Therefore, some groups of Alaska Natives, 
most notably the Sealaska Heritage Institute, have taken measures to 
protect their cultural property and have begun to call for increased 
intellectual property protection.5 Unfortunately, most of the works these 
groups seek to protect are not eligible for copyright protection because 
of conflicts with copyright requirements. For instance, the requirement 
of fixation in a tangible medium of expression6 would preclude 
protection for oral folklore and songs. Additionally, many of the 
remedies these groups desire, such as the ability to block the use of 
sacred images, cannot be provided under current copyright laws. 
Therefore, Alaska Natives and other indigenous groups would have to 
obtain intellectual property-like protection through a sui generis regime, 
deviating from the existing framework.  
This issue is not limited to Alaska. Indigenous intellectual property 
issues have attracted global attention. Despite many efforts to address 
indigenous communities’ need and desire to protect their intellectual 
property, the international community has not reached a consensus 
about how to accomplish this goal.7 The World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) continues to be involved in efforts to develop a 
framework to approach and address these issues.8 Indigenous peoples’ 
 
photos of the museum collection). 
 4.  Northwest Coast Ceremonial Rattle, CHRISTIE’S, http://www.christies.com 
/lotfinder/northwest-coast-ceremonial-raven-rattle-probably-tlingit 
/5400615/lot/lot_details.aspx?from=salesummary&intObjectID 
=5400615&sid=d73d8283-3de0-4e1e-9ad1-79b57add7027 (last visited Oct. 7, 
2012) (displaying a photo of the rattle and a brief description). 
 5.  See, e.g., Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights Policy, SEALASKA 
HERITAGE INST. (Jan. 16, 2004), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/ 
www/tk/en/folklore /creative_heritage/docs/sealaska_cultural_policy.pdf 
(describing process implemented by the Sealaska Heritage Institute). 
 6.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists, in 
accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression . . . .”). 
 7.  Jane Anderson, issues paper, Indigenous/Traditional Knowledge & 
Intellectual Property, at 2 (2010), available at http://web.law.duke.edu/cspd 
/itkpaper (discussing the state of international efforts to protect traditional 
intellectual property, and referencing organizations working on the issue). 
 8.  Matters Concerning the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property 
and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
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concerns range across all areas of the intellectual property spectrum, 
and, as will be discussed in more detail, the protection of any particular 
item may simultaneously raise questions that span many areas of 
intellectual property law.9 
Outsiders commonly exploit the intellectual property of indigenous 
persons. Many medical discoveries have relied on indigenous people’s 
knowledge of the properties of local plants.10 From this body of 
knowledge ethnobotanists and other researchers have analyzed 
rainforest plants, hoping to identify chemical compounds to serve as 
active ingredients in pharmaceuticals.11 Beyond serving as source 
material for pharmaceutical research, traditional cultural practices can 
become commodities themselves: Bikram Choudhury studied yoga, 
selected several positions, then copyrighted his arrangement of the 
poses to develop the yoga program that bears his name. Yoga studio 
owners who want to use the Bikram yoga sequence, or to use the name 
Bikram Yoga, must license from Choudhury.12 Although the validity of 
his copyright has been challenged, lawsuits against infringing studios 
have settled, leaving questions over the validity of Bikram’s copyright 
unresolved.13 
The Bikram Yoga example highlights a greater issue: scholarly 
research on indigenous knowledge can receive copyright protection. 
Thus, if an academic catalogues dance series or rituals, that could be 
copyrighted. When indigenous groups seek to use the collections as 
source material, they may need to secure the permission of the copyright 
owners to make use of the indigenous groups’ own historic cultural 
 
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, at 4 (Oct. 5, 2011), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/govbody/en/wo_ga_40/wo_ga_40_7.pdf 
(detailing a framework for the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore). 
 9.  Anderson, supra note 7, at 2 (discussing how a single traditional piece 
could raise issues regarding copyright, trademark, design, and confidential 
information). 
 10.  See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 128 (1st ed. 1996) (describing two 
examples: tribal medicines being successful in killing the AIDS virus, and vinca 
alkaloids from Madagascar being used to treat diabetes). 
 11.  See id. 
 12.  Anderson, supra note 7, at 11–12 (discussing Bikram Choudhury’s 
copyrights, licensing process, and aggressive enforcement of his copyright 
claim). 
 13.  See, e.g., Open Source Yoga Unity v. Bikram Choudhury, No. C 03-3182 
PJH, 2005 WL 756558, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005) (“[T]here are numerous 
questions of fact at issue which prevent the court from determining on summary 
judgment . . . .”); Anderson, supra note 7, at 12 (arguing that Choudhury’s 
selection and arrangement of the poses would likely satisfy the criteria for 
copyrighting compilations of facts and ideas). 
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property.14 Therefore, Bikram Choudhury’s actions unsurprisingly 
prompted “a large scale effort to catalog the estimated 1500 asanas, yoga 
body positions, in order to prevent [future] cases.”15 
This Note will survey several topics pertaining to Alaska Natives’ 
cultural property. Section I provides an overview of copyright, the area 
of American intellectual property law most related to the protection of 
artistic property, focusing on copyright’s requirements and its 
theoretical grounding. Section II discusses generally Native American 
views on property and the difficulties encountered when seeking to 
apply copyright law to Native American works. This Section will 
contrast the United States’ unwillingness to judicially recognize 
collective property rights with two Australian cases. Section III 
highlights two existing methods to accomplish some of the goals of 
Alaska Native groups: the Silver Hand authentication program, a 
collective mark, and Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), which allows tribes to seek trade secret-
like protection for their sacred cultural property. Section IV surveys 
recent, or current, topics of interest to Alaska Natives, highlighting that 
disputes could be resolved without needing to alter intellectual property 
law. 
I. THE EXISTING AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
FRAMEWORK: INHERENT BIASES OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 
Understanding the potential for conflicts between Alaska Natives’ 
concerns and the American legal system requires an understanding of 
the existing copyright framework. Copyright is the dominant paradigm 
for the protection of cultural property in the United States. This system 
incentivizes and rewards artists and authors by granting time-limited 
exclusive rights, including the rights to make reproductions and 
adaptations. These rights allow the author to block certain uses of his 
work.16 Copyright intends to balance incentives for authors with the 
public’s interest in having unfettered access to a comprehensive 
inventory of cultural property.17 Thus, once the copyright protection 
 
 14.  Anderson, supra note 7, at 24 (proposing a copyright exception for 
indigenous people for works derived from their cultural knowledge). 
 15.  Id. at 12 (discussing a potential legal challenge to Bikram’s copyrights as 
a misappropriation of cultural knowledge). 
 16.  MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 2 (5th ed. 2010) 
(discussing that copyright law creates property rights for intangible products or 
“works of authorship”). 
 17.  JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 48–49 (1st ed. 2008) (discussing the 
theoretical framework of the public domain). In a famous dissent, Justice 
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term ends for a given work, that work permanently enters the public 
domain.18 
By comparison, many European countries protect literary and 
creative expression using an analogous system, droit d’auteur. In contrast 
to the common law copyright system, droit d’auteur emphasizes authors’ 
moral rights, chiefly the right of authors to control and protect their 
works.19 These rights evidence a philosophical starting point that is 
more strongly supportive of authors. For instance, under this system 
authors may object to any action that would abridge, distort, or 
prejudicially alter their works.20 
Since the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, artistic expression 
has, by default, received copyright protection.21 Works obtain automatic 
protection upon the moment of fixation in a tangible medium of 
expression.22 This protection lasts for seventy years after the life of the 
author to allow the author and his heirs to benefit financially.23  
A. Requirements for Copyright Protection 
To be eligible for copyright protection, an item must be more than 
simply an idea or concept. Traditionally, explanations and expressions 
receive copyright protection, while the concepts and ideas do not; the 
 
Brandeis articulated that “[t]he general rule of law is, that the noblest of human 
productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become, 
after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use.” Int’l 
News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (discussing the copying and 
dissemination of wire source news articles by third parties). 
 18.  BOYLE, supra note 17, at 48–49 (noting, however, that the public domain 
of “facts and ideas” is being enclosed, and the idea of common intellectual 
property is under assault). 
 19.  LEAFFER, supra note 16, at 389 (two fundamental components of this 
system include the rights of integrity and paternity). 
 20.  See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 26 (2d Cir. 1976) (abridging 
episodes of Monty Python was an action that impermissibly and prejudicially 
altered the authors’ work). 
 21.  BOYLE, supra note 17, at 184 (placing liberal requirements on copyright 
creation with no formal notice or application). This is a contrast from the prior 
1909 Copyright Act, under which copyright protection was only obtained upon 
publication and only if an author complied with the requisite formalities, such as 
notice. See 1909 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1926) (requiring copyright notice, 
registration, and deposit). 
 22.  BOYLE, supra note 17, at 184; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A work is 
‘created’ when it is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time; where a 
work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that has been fixed at 
any particular time constitutes the work as of that time, and where the work has 
been prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a separate work.”). 
 23.   Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012) (the Copyright 
Term Extension Act added an additional twenty years from fifty to seventy). 
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latter instead enter the public domain.24 In certain contexts, there may be 
only limited ways to express a particular idea. This situation, called the 
merger doctrine, precludes copyright protection, lest the idea receive 
backdoor copyright. 
1. Fixation 
First and fundamentally, a work must be fixed. Fixation occurs as 
soon as an idea is manifest in a tangible medium, such as writing a 
sentence or drawing an image.25 This requirement relates to the 
constitutional bases of intellectual property protection; the intellectual 
property clause affords protection to “writings.”26 Thus, a work must be 
embodied in some stable format, a requirement that can be met once the 
work is recorded or written. This leads to an important distinction: 
performances cannot qualify for copyright, but recordings of the 
performance as well as scripts written in advance of the performance, 
can support copyright.27 
2. Originality 
A work must also be original.28 In order to be original, a work must 
be more than a trivial variation on something already existing, either 
currently under copyright or in the public domain.29 The originality 
inquiry focuses on whether an author has contributed any identifiable 
artistic expression; absent any originality, a work cannot be considered 
the product of the author seeking copyright.30 
The two elements of originality are some modest amount of 
creative authorship and independent creation. In the definitive case in 
this area, Feist v. Rural Telephone Service,31 the Supreme Court articulated 
the rule that only a modicum of creativity is required for a work to be 
 
 24.  BOYLE, supra note 10, at 208 (highlighting the fundamental distinction 
between the underlying idea and the copyrightable product). 
 25.  LEAFFER, supra note 16, at 49 (“The Supreme Court has construed the 
‘writings’ requirement to mean any physical rendering of the fruits of 
intellectual activity.”). 
 26.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (promoting “Science and the useful Arts”). 
 27.  LEAFFER, supra note 16, at 49–51 (stating that “mere performance of a 
work does not qualify under this provision”). 
 28.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright subsists . . . in original works of 
authorship.”). 
 29.  See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 488–89 (2d Cir. 
1976) (no originality in plaintiff’s bank design, which was virtually identical to 
an existing public domain bank design). 
 30.  See 1 DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 (rev. ed. 2009) 
(distinguishing novelty and originality). 
 31.  499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
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considered sufficiently original to merit copyright protection.32 
Similarly, independent creation sets a relatively low bar. Unlike patent 
law, which requires novelty and non-obviousness, two works may be 
substantially similar or even identical, yet if both were independently 
created, each can qualify for copyright protection.33 
3. Authorship 
The concept of authorship provides a theoretical grounding for 
copyright law.34 Notions of authorship have varied widely across 
Western history;35 as recently as the medieval period, authors were 
viewed as divinely inspired craftsmen.36  It was not until the eighteenth 
century that theorists began to regard inspiration as “emanating not 
from outside or above,” but rather “from within the writer himself.”37 
This Romantic notion of authorship viewed writing as “an extreme 
assertion of the self.”38 Authors became viewed as innovators, who, 
using the raw materials of culture and prior knowledge, added original 
ideas and expression to create distinct works.39 This view essentially 
considers writing a manifestation of the author’s personality, regardless 
of the aesthetic quality or purpose of the work.40 In turn, the Romantic 
 
 32.  Id. at 345–46 (distinguishing novelty from creativity, and stating that 
similarity between two works does not defeat originality so long as the 
similarity is not the result of copying). 
 33.  LEAFFER, supra note 16, at 57 (stating that “nothing prevents a valid claim 
of copyright on two or more substantially similar works so long as they were 
independently created”). This situation may be increasingly unlikely in an 
increasingly connected world; questions of access to works have decided 
copyright infringement actions. See, e.g., Three Boys Music v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 
477, 482 (9th Cir. 2000) (inferring access on basis of popular song’s airplay). 
 34.  BOYLE, supra note 10, at 53 (noting that authorship was historically 
devalued in favor of those who could copy and interpret old texts). 
 35.  See id. (pointing to medieval church literature, where the “real task of 
the scholar was not the vain excogitation of novelties but a discovery of great old 
books”). 
 36.  Id. at 53–54 (authors were viewed on the same level as a publisher or 
typesetter, another machine element in the production of written material). 
 37.  Id. at 54 (for example, prior to the rise of the Romantic view of 
authorship, the English language lacked a word for plagiarism). 
 38.  Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of 
“Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 455 (1991) (discussing the view of authorship 
during the eighteenth century). 
 39.  BOYLE, supra note 10, at 54–55 (arguing that the originality of the form of 
the work shapes the ideas contained therein, thus the author must retain the 
right to exclude others from altering the form of the work). 
 40.  Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903). 
Though the work in question was used in advertising, Justice Holmes 
considered it a work of authorship: “The copy is the personal reaction of an 
individual upon nature. Personality always contains something unique . . . . 
[Even] a very modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one 
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view of authorship justifies rewarding authors’ efforts in producing 
literary and artistic works with the right to control the use and 
distribution of their works.41 
This Romantic notion of authorship also provides a strong platform 
for the moral rights seen in Continental Europe.42 In these legal systems, 
authors have the right to withdraw works from circulation, to claim 
attribution (the “paternity” right), and to prevent destruction or 
mutilation of their works (the “integrity” right).43 These rights clearly 
derive from a view “that the work of art is an extension of the artist’s 
personality, an expression of his innermost being. To mistreat the work 
of art is to mistreat the artist, to invade his area of privacy, to impair his 
personality.”44  
Despite their prominence in European law, moral rights have never 
fully caught on in the United States.45  As these moral rights are 
generally inalienable and can be invoked even after sale of intellectual 
property rights, some consider moral rights to “represent a charter for 
private censorship,”46 which is incompatible with the public interest. 
However, Congress has given some limited recognition of moral rights. 
Because of certain foreign treaty obligations,47 Congress eventually 
enacted the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”).48 VARA allows 
creators of works of “fine art” to obtain the rights of attribution, 
integrity, or protection from distortion.49 It also protects works of 
“recognized stature” against destruction.50 Determining whether a work 
of art is of the requisite “recognized stature” requires judges to assess its 
 
man’s alone. That something he may copyright . . . .” Id. at 249–50. 
 41.  Jaszi, supra note 38, at 466 (challenging the notion of authorship as it 
relates to copyright). 
 42.  Id. at 496 (discussing the entrenched Romantic notion of authorship in 
Continental European legal systems). 
 43.  Id. (discussing generally the rights-based approach to copyright). 
 44.  Id. at 497 (quoting JOHN H. MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, 
AND THE VISUAL ARTS 145 (2d ed. 1987)). 
 45.  LEAFFER, supra note 16, at 392–93 (stating that “Congress justified its 
decision not to adopt specific moral rights legislation, claiming that the United 
States already gives de facto recognition to moral rights when the entirety of 
American law is considered”). 
 46.  Jaszi, supra note 38, at 497 (discussing the suppressing effect of assigning 
moral rights to authorship). 
 47.  Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Property, 
Art. 6bis, 1971. 
 48.  Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990). 
 49.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106A. VARA-eligible works can include paintings, 
drawings, and sculptures, so long as the work is produced in no more than 200 
numbered and signed copies. Id. 
 50.  Id. 
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aesthetic merits,51 which deviates from copyright’s otherwise established 
principle that judges should not make decisions about artistic and 
aesthetic quality.52 
B.  Rights of a Copyright Holder and Limitations to the Exclusive 
Rights 
During the term of copyright protection, the owner of a copyright 
in a work enjoys a bundle of certain exclusive rights.53 These rights 
include reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance, display, 
and the right to transmit digital sound recordings.54 Violating any of 
these exclusive rights constitutes copyright infringement.55 Because the 
rights may overlap in certain contexts, the same act may simultaneously 
infringe multiple exclusive rights.56 
Despite these exclusive rights, the Copyright Act contains several 
exceptions.57 One of the most important, fair use,58 allows certain 
privileged uses in situations where the public interest in access to a 
work outweighs the interest in protecting the work under copyright 
law.59 
 
 51.  See, e.g., Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 612 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(demonstrating a rigorous standard for assessing whether a work is “of 
recognized stature,” including expert testimony, critical acclaim, and journalistic 
coverage). 
 52.  See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249–50 (1903) 
(articulating that the granting of a copyright should not be premised on a work’s 
artistic merit or intended use). 
 53.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (defining the exclusive rights of copyrighted 
works, including right to reproduce, create derivative works based upon 
original, distribute copies, and perform or display publicly). 
 54.  Id. (enumerating rights granted under statute). 
 55.  See § 501(a) (defining one who infringes a copyright as any person who 
violates those rights exclusive to the owner of the copyright). 
 56.  LEAFFER, supra note 16, at 294 (stating that “the same act may 
simultaneously infringe both the reproduction and adaptation rights”). 
 57.  See §§ 107–122 (exemptions on exclusive rights include provisions for 
fair use, restrictions for media outlets, recordings, visual displays, and computer 
programs). 
 58.  § 107 (detailing the factors considered when determining whether a use 
of copyright material falls within the fair use exception). 
 59.  Jerome Reichman & Ruth Okediji, The Fair Use Approach in the United 
States, 96 U. MINN. L. REV. 1362, 1393–94 (2012). See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Bernard 
Greis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that the public 
interest in accessing the only existing footage of the Kennedy assassination 
supported a fair use defense); but see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985) (rejecting a fair use defense where a publisher 
excerpted the “heart of the book” from Gerald Ford’s memoir shortly before its 
forthcoming publication.). 
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Litigating copyright disputes requires proving both ownership of a 
valid copyright and infringement by violation of at least one of the 
exclusive rights. Litigation is a costly process and may be very time 
consuming. As a result, many individuals choose to comply with 
licensing arrangements rather than expose themselves to potential 
liability, even in situations where exceptions, such as fair use, could 
have applied.60  Intellectual property law may thus stifle creativity and 
burden the very artistic and creative processes it seeks to encourage.61 
II. COMMON INDIGENOUS VIEWS OF PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND 
TENSIONS WITH THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 
Aspects of indigenous groups’ cultural property do not always 
coincide with the assumptions that underlie both the copyright and droit 
d’auteur systems. Because of these potential incompatibilities, many 
indigenous groups view intellectual property regimes with deep 
skepticism.62 Some indigenous people view adopting intellectual 
property laws as acquiescing to the legacy of colonialism.63 
A. Baseline approaches to cultural property 
The Anglo-American copyright system grants exclusive rights as an 
incentive to encourage authors and artists to create. Like most western 
property law systems, copyright is a bundle of rights including rights to 
absolute possession, to exclude others, and to dispose of property 
freely.64  Thus, copyright fits neatly into the western legal paradigm. 
By contrast, indigenous communities have different conceptions of 
property ownership. Exclusive ownership is rare among North 
American tribes.65 Tribes nevertheless may recognize ownership in 
intangible items like songs, stories, or even practices such as fishing or 
 
 60.  See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 17, at 158 (citing the music industry’s 
compulsory licensing scheme). 
 61.  See id. at 158–59 (noting, however, that there is a potential shift to 
recognize that copyright laws do stifle the creativity they purport to protect). 
 62.  ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: 
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 245 (1st ed. 1998) (arguing that 
reducing communal relationships in Native tribes to copyrights would degrade 
the social fabric of the society). 
 63.  See id. (describing the assertion of rights over traditional art forms as a 
part of self-determination). 
 64.  17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (defining copyright ownership). 
 65.  Ruth L. Gana, Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some Implications of 
the Internationalization of Intellectual Property, 24 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 109, 132 
(1995) (contrasting Native American and Anglo-American conceptions of 
individual ownership). 
SCHUSSEL_V8.0 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2012  5:59 PM 
2012 COPYRIGHT AND CULTURAL PROPERTY 323 
gathering plants.66 Some compare ownership in these cultural practices, 
such as oral storytelling, as responsibilities more akin to stewardship 
rather than “rights,”67 since often ownership of the practices or rituals 
reflects a member’s role in the group.68 
Thus, the incentive rationale that underlies copyright may be 
irrelevant to the concerns of indigenous societies, where cases about 
intellectual property have more often focused on “the sanctity of a 
process or idea, . . . and in particular, [efforts] to preserve the sacredness 
of an object.”69 Tribes typically do not concern themselves with the 
disposition of knowledge within the tribe, but consider impermissible 
the dissemination of knowledge and cultural patrimony to outsiders.70 
Incidentally, NAGPRA specifically seeks to address this problem by 
facilitating the repatriation of sacred objects and cultural patrimony to 
Native American tribes.71  
B. Difficulties of meeting the eligibility requirements for copyright 
protection 
Many aspects of indigenous cultural property conflict with the 
theoretical grounding and legal requirements of copyright law. On a 
theoretical level, copyright operates in “the private realm of artistic 
activity.”72 Intellectual property law protects private actors, who draw 
on a public culture to produce private, tangible works.73 In one view, the 
 
 66.  Id. 
 67.   COOMBE, supra note 62, at 245 n.164 (“Those so-called ‘rights’ are the 
result of traditional people fulfilling responsibilities . . . through traditional 
ceremony and lifestyle . . . .” (quoting D. Alexis, Obscurity as a Lifestyle, 23 
BORDERLINES 15 (1991–92))). 
 68.  Rennard Strickland, Implementing the National Policy of Understanding, 
Preserving, and Safeguarding the Heritage of Indian Peoples and Native Hawaiians: 
Human Rights, Sacred Objects, and Cultural Patrimony, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 175, 184 
(1992) (An individual’s power may be manifest in “implements, fetishes, 
medicine bundles, charms, songs, dances, and rituals. Sacred power, or 
medicine, was obtained through spirit visitations during visions, supernatural 
gifts, ceremonial transfer, or inheritance.”). 
 69.   Gana, supra note 65, at 134 (citing Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Party, Ltd. 
(1994) 54 FCR 240, 240 (Austl.) (finding that the sale of art portrayed on rugs 
damaged not only the individual artists, but also the community)). 
 70.  Id. at 133 (discussing ownership paradigms of various indigenous 
populations). 
 71.  See, e.g., Strickland, supra note 68, at 180–81 (“NAGPRA has placed the 
primary task of factual determination in the Native culture itself.”). 
 72.  Terence Dougherty, Group Rights to Cultural Survival: Intellectual Property 
Rights in Native American Cultural Symbols, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 355, 374–
75 (1998) (contrasting “private artistic activity” with “public cultural 
production”). 
 73.  Id. (noting that art produced by “public cultural production” is viewed 
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public domain supplies cultural raw materials, such as beliefs and 
common symbols, which are considered to be created by “collectivities” 
rather than any particular individual.74 Many of the objects Alaska 
Natives are concerned about protecting, such as crests and symbols, 
would fall into this category of collective property, material more 
typically regarded as cultural inputs rather than outputs. Therefore, in 
theory these materials belong in the public domain, and are accordingly 
ineligible for copyright protection. 
Similarly, copyright’s emphasis on authorship presents additional 
hurdles for indigenous works. The 1976 Act requires an identifiable 
author or group of authors, who evidence intent to create a work.75 As 
discussed above, authorship is rooted in Romantic ideals of authors as 
individuals. This stands in stark contrast to Native communities’ 
attitudes, where tribal works originate “in the group, not the 
individual.”76 Furthermore, in the case of many works, such as songs or 
stories, it is “unlikely, given indigenous methods of production, that any 
individual tribal member ever claimed the role of ‘author.’”77 Often, 
knowledge of a specific creator will have passed on, rendering the work 
untraceable.78 Last, even if the original author is known or discoverable, 
since copyright is a time-limited regime, any potential copyright likely 
would have expired in works that are generations old.79 
Native works with collective authorship could also be considered 
joint works.80 Joint works are “work[s] prepared by two or more authors 
 
to be owned by the public rather than particular individuals). 
 74.  Id. (making it nearly impossible to identify a distinct author). 
 75.  17 U.S.C. §§ 101–02 (2012) (discussing that copyright protection extends 
to “original works of authorship,” as compared to an “anonymous” work in 
which no natural person can be identified as author); see also Angela Riley, Note, 
Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous 
Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 190 (2000) (highlighting the 
importance of defining authorship in light of the Act’s explicit requirement of a 
discreet author or group of authors). 
 76.  Riley, supra note 75, at 191 (noting the demonization of communal work 
in western, capitalist culture). 
 77.  Id. (noting that works with untraceable authors cannot receive copyright 
protection). 
 78.  Id. (stating that even if the creator were identified, he or she would most 
likely have passed away, with the relevant result that the work is “untraceable” 
in terms of authorship and therefore may not be granted copyright protection); 
see also Richard Guest, Intellectual Property Rights and Native American Tribes, 20 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 111, 124 (1995) (enumerating the requirements for copyright 
protection under the Copyright Act). 
 79.  Riley, supra note 75, at 191 n.83 (copyrighted works cannot be protected 
in perpetuity). 
 80.  Id. at 192 (describing the requirements under the Copyright Act to be 
classified as a “joint work”). 
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with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or 
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”81 Similar difficulties arise 
when attempting to apply this framework to Native works. First, the 
parties must have intended, at the moment of creation, that their 
contributions be merged into a joint work.82 Second, the authors must 
have been known, which is often infeasible.83 Thus, indigenous works 
will fail to be eligible for copyright even as joint works. 
Indigineous works might also not qualify as original. Instead, many 
works could be considered “serial collaborations,” with elaboration on 
ideas by a series of authors, “occurring perhaps over years or 
decades.”84 These serial collaborations reflect the centrality of stories to 
group identity.85 However, because it may be difficult to identify any 
element of a work that is an author’s distinct and original contribution, 
indigenous works may thus fail to satisfy this requirement.86 
Fixation presents yet another hurdle for Native American works. 
Copyright is generally “geared towards protecting the printed word,”87 
a baseline exemplified in the fixation requirement. Thus, copyright 
protection is precluded for works which are unwritten but rather 
transmitted orally.88 Fixing oral traditions in writing isolates a particular 
version of a story, and forces tribes to abandon the traditional medium 
of expression.89 However, even works that satisfy the fixation 
requirement, such as sculptures or drawings, may still be precluded 
from copyright protection on other grounds. 
Since many Native works are not eligible for copyright, the owners 
of the works or the tribes will be unable to avail themselves of 
 
 81.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); see also § 201(a) (making authors of a joint work 
co-owners of the copyright). 
 82.  NIMMER, supra note 30, § 6.02. 
 83.  Riley, supra note 75, at 193 (also noting that joint intent at the time of 
creation is also often infeasible in tribal art). 
 84.  Id. at 188 (noting that tribal art such as traditional songs have an 
unknown origination point). 
 85.  Id. at 189 (highlighting the importance of traditional creation stories to 
tribal cultures). 
 86.  See COOMBE, supra note 62, at 229 (discussing a difficulty in separating 
“texts from ongoing creative production, or ongoing creativity from social 
relationships” as intellectual property law strives to do). 
 87.  Riley, supra note 75, at 186 (noting that the emphasis on the printed word 
derives from Anglo-American culture). 
 88.  Id. (stating that oral transmissions “fall entirely outside the sphere of 
Anglo-American copyright protection”); see also Gana, supra note 65, at 128 
(discussing other works and practices which could fail to meet the fixation 
requirement, such as the Yoruba “talking drums”). 
 89.  Riley, supra note 75, at 195 (proposing that indigenous philosophies 
should be incorporated to deal with Tribal works). 
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copyright’s remedies. If no copyright is recognized in a work, there is no 
right to block reproductions or derivative works based on that 
underlying work.90 
III. COLLECTIVE RIGHTS 
Native groups are not only concerned with the outright 
infringement of their cultural property,91 but are also concerned with the 
translation and resulting distortion of their works,92 as well as the 
misuse of sacred objects,93 harms which NAGPRA strives to avoid.94 
These concerns seem apt for protections provided in a moral rights 
framework. 
Nevertheless, American courts have faced difficulties in cases 
involving Native American cultural property. In order to arrive at 
outcomes in line with the interests of tribes, courts must be able to assess 
collective rights. Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson95 demonstrates the 
federal courts’ failure to recognize collective rights.96 This Alaska case 
involved the Chilkat tribe’s efforts to recover cultural artifacts after their 
sale by caretakers.97 The artifacts in question, the Whale House of the 
Chilkat, four wooden carved posts and a partition, were considered “the 
finest example of Native art, either Tlingit or Tsimshian, in Alaska.”98 
 
 90.  Id. at 179 (discussing the parameters of contemporary copyright law, in 
which narrowly defined boundaries are drawn). 
 91.  Id. at 197 (discussing the appropriation and manipulation of Native 
cultural art). 
 92.  Strickland, supra note 68, at 185. “A non-Indian viewer of a Hopi figure, 
a Tlingit mask, or a Shoshone-painted hide translates the object into the familiar 
framework of his own culture. In doing so he confronts the same distortion as 
the English-speaking reader of a translated Cherokee love song . . . . No longer a 
linguistic reflection of its maker, the song becomes a carnival mirror, distorting 
the delicate thought patterns of its creator’s culture.” Id. 
 93.  Id. (comparing non-Native perceptions of Native linguistic art and the 
viewing of Native objects, asserting that the distortions are equivalent). 
 94.  See H.R. Rep. No. 877, at 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 
4368 (“The purpose of H.R. [NAGPRA] is to protect Native American burial sites 
and the removal of human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects 
of cultural patrimony on Federal, Indian and Native Hawaiian lands.”). 
 95.  870 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 96.  Id. at 1476 (holding that claims of conversion of Native property did not 
arise under federal law). 
 97.  Id. at 1471 (describing the articles in question, four wooden posts and a 
wooden partition called a “rain screen”). 
 98.  George T. Emmons, The Whale House of the Chilkat, in RAVEN’S BONES 68, 
81 (Andrew Hope III ed., 1982) (1916)  (“It is unquestionably the finest example 
of native art, either Tlingit or Tsimishian, in Alaska, in boldness of conception—
although highly conventionalized in form—in execution of detail, and in the 
selection and arrangement of colors.”). 
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For years, outsiders engaged in efforts to purchase or steal the 
Whale House.99 Defendant Johnson, a Native American art dealer, 
successfully made a deal with the artifacts’ caretakers.100 The Chilkat 
tribe claimed the artifacts were communal property, or property owned 
in trust, and thus the artifacts could neither be owned nor transferred by 
the caretakers. Although the Chilkat Village had previously passed an 
ordinance forbidding the removal of tribal cultural property,101 the 
artifacts were removed and shipped to Johnson, the purchaser. The tribe 
sued to recover the artifacts, but the Ninth Circuit upheld the district 
court’s dismissal of the Chilkat claims.102 The court refused to consider 
communal property rights, since they were (and remain) unrecognized 
in federal law.103 Dismissing the remaining claims, the Ninth Circuit 
agreed with the district court that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to 
rule on claims grounded in the Chilkat Village ordinance, since those 
claims did not arise under federal law.104 
While the study of American intellectual property law reveals a 
bias against collective rights,105 this does not mean American law is 
blind to collective rights. Even as far back as the so-called “Indian 
Commerce Clause,”106 tribes have been uniquely recognized “as quasi-
 
 99.  Chilkat, 870 F.2d at 1471 (“On April 22, 1984, several defendants 
removed the four posts and the rain screen from Klukwan and delivered them to 
defendant Michael Johnson, an Arizona art dealer.”). 
 100.  Rachael Grad, Note, Indigenous Rights and Intellectual Property Law: A 
Comparison of the United States and Australia, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 203, 215 
(2003) (“Upon hearing that Johnson had reached a deal with one of the elderly 
caretakers, Chilkat tribal members blocked the village road and passed an 
ordinance forbidding the removal of cultural property without tribal 
permission.”). 
 101.  Chilkat, 870 F.2d at 1471 (The ordinance stated, “[n]o person shall enter 
on to the property of the Chilkat Indian Village for the purpose of buying, 
trading for, soliciting the purchase of, or otherwise seeking to arrange the 
removal of artifacts, clan crests, or other traditional Indian art work owned or 
held by members of the Chilkat Indian Village or kept within the boundaries of 
the real property owned by the Chilkat Indian Village, without first requesting 
and obtaining permission to do so from the Chilkat Indian Village Council.”). 
 102.  Id. at 1472–73 (“We agree that section 1163 provides no right of action.”). 
 103.  Id. (“We also agree with the district court that the Village’s first and fifth 
causes of action amount to claims for conversion, and that they do not arise 
under federal law.”). 
 104.  Id. Thereafter, a case was brought in the Chilkat Indian Village Tribal 
Court. Tribal Court Judge Bowen upheld the validity of the ordinance and 
ordered the return of the artifacts. Chilkat Indian Village, IRA v. Johnson, 90-01 
(Chilkat Tr. Ct., 1993) (“The artifacts are to be returned to the Whale House in 
Klukwan.”). 
 105.  See generally Riley, supra note 75, at 194 (“When all possible avenues of 
copyright doctrine are examined, it is clear that no Western definitions of 
authorship are capable of accommodating communal works.”). 
 106.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. (Empowering Congress “[t]o regulate 
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sovereign nations-within-a-nation.”107 In a more recent legislative 
development, the passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act108 by 
Congress displayed sensitivity to the unique aspects of tribal culture and 
values that tribal children learn in the home.109 Congress determined 
that the “collective nature of tribal life itself” required efforts to keep 
children within tribal families.110 To achieve this goal, Indian child 
welfare proceedings must give preference to placing children with 
members of their extended families or families chosen by the tribe.111 
Another important statute, NAGPRA, discussed in greater detail in 
Section IV, recognizes the collective nature of tribes and the group 
interest in seeking return of sacred property. 
By contrast, Australian courts have taken a broader view of 
collective rights when assessing indigenous intellectual property rights. 
In Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Party, Ltd.,112 an Australian company 
manufactured carpets in Vietnam that reproduced the designs of several 
prominent indigenous artists.113 The artists sold some paintings to the 
Australian National Gallery, which produced posters of the paintings; 
Indofurn obtained the images from these posters.114 The plaintiffs 
brought a copyright infringement action against Indofurn, seeking 
compensation, as well as acknowledgement of the communal harm 
resulting from unauthorized use of aboriginal designs.”115 
Accepting the artists’ arguments, the court awarded plaintiffs 
 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes”). 
 107.  Riley, supra note 75, at 205. However, there has not been continuous 
recognition of sovereignty. Id. at 206 n.143. 
 108.  25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (1983) (“Recognizing the special relationship 
between the United States and the Indian tribes and their members and the 
Federal responsibility to the Indian people, Congress finds . . . .”). 
 109.  Riley, supra note 75, at 211–12 (“In evaluating a proper scheme for the 
Indian child welfare system, Congress focused on the ‘values of Indian culture,’ 
rather than the Anglo-American model, which is heavily centered around 
preferencing the rights of the individual over the community.”). 
 110.  Id. at 212 (“Congress recognized that Indian communities place a 
profound emphasis on ‘collective rights’ thinking, in which Indians are taught to 
conceive of themselves as part of the larger cultural group, in which every child 
belongs to its family as well as to the tribe”); see also Jennifer Nutt Carleton, The 
ICWA: A Study in the Codification of the Ethnic Best Interests of the Child, 81 MARQ. 
L. REV. 21, 38 (1997) (“Many Indians are taught to think of themselves as part of 
the larger group, where every child belongs to both its family and to the tribe.”). 
 111.  25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)–(b) (2012). 
 112.  (1994) 54 FCR 240, 240 (Austl.). 
 113.  Id. at 240 (“In 1991, the first respondent commenced importation of 
carpets manufactured in Vietnam which reproduced Aboriginal artworks, the 
copyright in which was owned by the applicants.”). 
 114.  Id. at 244–50. 
 115.  Gana, supra note 65, at 134. 
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damages for copyright infringement and injunctions to prevent the 
further use of the images.116 The defendants’ actions threatened to 
distort the paintings’ meanings.117 The use of the paintings as images for 
carpet was considered particularly offensive to the indigenous people.118 
However, despite the court’s deference to the indigenous community, 
the decision, which rested on copyright principles, awarded 
compensation only to the individual artists.119 
More recently, in the case of Bulun Bulun v. R&T Textiles Party, 
Ltd.,120 an indiginous artist who owned a valid copyright in his work 
sued after discovering that his paintings were being used in textiles 
produced by the defendant. The plaintiff argued that the “unauthorised 
reproduction of [the image] threaten[s] the whole system and ways that 
underpin the stability and continuance of Yolngu society,” by interfering 
with relationships between artists and their community and thwarting 
generations of custom.121 The court agreed, finding that a fiduciary 
relationship exists between artists and their communities: “the interest 
of Ganalbingu people in protection of that ritual knowledge from 
exploitation which is contrary to their law and custom is deserving of 
the protection of the Australian legal system.”122  
Thus, Australian courts have recognized the need for indigenous 
people to be able to protect their communities’ intellectual property. 
Nevertheless, these cases may be less applicable in the context of Native 
American communities. Both Milupurrurru and Bulun Bulun involved 
identifiable artists whose works were protected under copyright. 
Additionally, the works were copied wholesale. 
While Chilkat was not an intellectual property dispute, the court’s 
 
 116.  Milpurrurru, 54 FCR at 272–83. 
 117.  Id. See Gana, supra note 65, at 134 (“Inaccuracy, or error in the faithful 
reproduction of painting, can cause deep offence to those familiar with the 
dreaming.”). 
 118.  Grad, supra note 100, at 218 (“This practice was particularly offensive to 
the aboriginal people because carpet is a medium for walking on, and its use is 
inconsistent with traditional aboriginal cultural practices.”). 
 119.  Id. Arguably, though, the broader community benefitted from the 
issuance of injunctions. 
 120.  (1998) 157 ALR 193 (Austl.). 
 121.  Id. at 199. 
 122.  Id. at 210–12 (“Central to the fiduciary concept is the protection of 
interests that can be regarded as worthy of judicial protection . . . . The evidence 
is all one way. The ritual knowledge relating to Djulibinyamurr embodied 
within the artistic work is of great importance to members of the Ganalbingu 
people. I have no hesitation in holding that the interest of Ganalbingu people in 
protection of that ritual knowledge from exploitation which is contrary to their 
law and custom is deserving of the protection of the Australian legal system.”) 
(citation omitted). 
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unwillingness to recognize collective property rights hints at the 
difficulty that would face Native American tribes seeking to copyright 
collectively produced cultural property absent specific statutory action. 
Some commentators have called for a sui generis intellectual property 
law that, like ICWA, “would give tribal governments primary 
jurisdiction over claims concerning their culturally important work.”123 
Such legislation would need to address the different modes of cultural 
production, such as serial collaboration, that frustrate efforts to apply 
federal intellectual property law to Native American works.124 
IV. PROGRAMS AND LEGISLATION CURRENTLY IN PLACE TO 
RECOGNIZE NATIVE AMERICAN BELIEFS AND PROTECT 
SIGNIFICANT WORKS 
Despite the difficulties of obtaining copyright protection, Alaska 
Native groups may take advantage of other programs currently in place 
to protect their intangible cultural property. Two of these avenues, 
authentication programs and NAGPRA, offer rights that reflect concepts 
similar to intellectual property protection, and are discussed below. 
A. Authentication Programs 
The sale of counterfeit goods is a global problem, and Native 
Alaksan arts and crafts are no exception. In 1996, the Federal Trade 
Comission took its most aggressive action in this area, after years of 
investigation, by filing complaints against two Seattle-based companies, 
Ivory Jack’s and Northwest Tribal Arts. These stores logged hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in profit by selling carvings created by Ngoc Ly, a 
Vietnamese carver, as authentic Alaskan works.125 In addition to 
stocking the artwork, the defendants provided false biographical 
information for the supposed carvers, and furnished the works with 
 
 123.  Jill Koren Kelley, Owning the Sun: Can Native Culture Be Protected Through 
Current Intellectual Property Law?, 7 J. HIGH TECH. L. 180, 197 (2007) (“Ultimately, 
proposals for a sui generis intellectual property law, which take into account 
diverse interests of Native American peoples, may be the most effective long-
term solution for overcoming the pitfalls of the current regime.”). 
 124.  Id. (“Legislation must also recognize the inherent difference between 
current copyright laws and property cumulatively created by more than one 
individual in a family line or by a group of individuals in a social institution.”). 
 125.  Ivory Jack’s and Northwest Tribal Arts to Settle FTC Charges that they Sold 
Fake Native American Artwork, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Apr. 12, 1996), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/04/ivory-j.shtm (Ly sold his wares 
under the Native-sounding alias “Eddie Lyngoc.”). 
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hangtags proclaiming the carvings to be Native-made.126 In settlement, 
the parties agreed to measures to prevent the further sale of falsely 
labeled goods, such as clearly labeling pieces as “Native style” instead of 
“Native made,” and ceasing to use Native-sounding names.127 
The Ivory Jack’s case illustrates some of the reasons behind 
authentication programs. Alaska Natives produce arts and crafts to 
supplement income or to support themselves.128 Economics aside, arts 
and crafts are also “a cultural gift and a source of self-esteem and 
identity within the Native community.”129 Native crafts have been 
heavily promoted by government officials “not so much as a way to 
improve the economic situation of Native artisans as for the benefit of 
the state’s fastest growing industry—tourism.”130 As the trade in Native-
produced crafts has flourished, sales of knockoffs and other problems of 
misrepresentation have also increased.131 In some cases, the quality of 
non-Native goods may be very high, with some artists struggling to 
match the quality of imitations.132 
In an attempt to clearly distinguish authentic Native crafts, Alaska 
 
 126.  Id. (“In addition to providing the artwork, the complaint alleges, the 
defendants provided shopowners with biographies describing Ron Komok’s 
Native-American heritage and training in carving, and hangtags stating that the 
carvings sold by Ivory Jack’s are Native-made.”). 
 127.  Id. (“The proposed consent decrees settling these charges, subject to 
court approval, would prohibit the defendants, in connection with the sale of 
Native-American style art objects, from representing that any such object is 
Native-made or that any such object is made in Alaska or made from materials 
of Alaskan origin, unless such is true and from misrepresenting the source of 
such objects, their country of origin, or the materials from which they are 
made.”). 
 128.  Julie Hollowell, Intellectual Property Protection and the Market for Alaska 
Native Arts and Crafts, in INDIGENOUS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 55, 57 (Mary 
Riley ed., 2004) (“Over half of all Alaska Natives live in mixed cash and 
subsistence economies, and, for many of them, locally produced arts and crafts 
act as vital supplements to income and one of the only sources of cash not 
dependent on government programs.”). 
 129.  Id. (“But arts and crafts are more than just a safety net; they are, as one 
carver described, a cultural gift and a source of self-esteem and identity within 
the Native community.”) (citation omitted). 
 130.  Id. The state’s apparent objectives were consumer protection and also a 
desire to “minimize the economic impact of products made elsewhere [i.e., out 
of state] that were flooding the tourist market.” Id. at 87 n.14. 
 131.  Id. at 60. Studies estimate that as much as 50% of “all Native or Indian 
arts and crafts sold in the United States may not have been made by American 
Indian people.” Id. Consumers have a clear preference for Native-made goods; 
FTC research indicates that consumers will pay 30-40% more for Native crafts. 
Id. 
 132.  Id. at 62 (“Second, they don’t produce enough work on a consistent basis 
or of consistent quality to supply the growing tourist demand.”). 
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developed the “Silver Hand” program.133 Administered by the Alaska 
State Council on the Arts,134 the state-sponsored program is available to 
Natives free of charge.135 The Silver Hand seal indicates to consumers 
“that the artwork on which it appears is created by hand in Alaska by an 
individual Alaska Native artist.”136 The Silver Hand is essentially a 
trademark, specifically a collective mark, which serves to identify the 
origin of goods. It provides no information, however, about the quality 
of the artwork or the authenticity of the craft’s design or form.137 
The Silver Hand program’s efficacy has been questioned.138 Some 
retailers have been hesitant to carry goods with the Silver Hand, in some 
cases even illegally139 removing stickers “so that non-Native items in 
their stores would not suffer from this ‘implication of inauthenticity.’”140 
At the same time, enforcement is questionable, and there have even been 
reports of goods marked with tags designed to imitate the Silver Hand, 
thereby directly competing with and diminishing the Silver Hand’s 
ability to “distinguish Native-made goods.”141 
Despite these concerns, the program has been revised and 
expanded, and is considered the most successful state-implemented 
authentication program, with high rates of adoption among Native 
 
 133.  See ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.65.010–45.65.070 (“The identification seal may be 
affixed only to original articles of authentic Alaska Native art created and 
crafted in the state.”). 
 134.  See Silver Hand Program, ALASKA STATE COUNCIL ON THE ARTS, 
http://www.eed.state.ak.us/aksca/native.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2012) (“The 
Silver Hand image . . . may only be used by individuals or organizations with 
the Alaska State Council on the Arts’ explicit permission.”). 
 135.  Hollowell, supra note 128, at 65. A certain number of tags are provided 
to artists for free; if more are needed, they are available at a nominal rate. See 
Alaska Native Arts Program, ALASKA STATE COUNCIL ON THE ARTS, 
http://www.eed.state.ak.us/aksca/native.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
 136.  Id. (“The seal indicates that the artwork on which it appears is created by 
hand in Alaska by an individual Alaska Native artist.”). 
 137.  Hollowell, supra note 128, at 65 (“The Silver Hand emblem has nothing 
to do with quality or with the authenticity of Native designs or art forms.”). 
 138.  See id. (“Many people consider the Silver Hand virtually meaningless 
without adequate enforcement and public education for tourists and shop 
owners.”). 
 139.  See ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.060 (stating that misuse or abuse of the Silver 
Hand constitutes a Class B felony). 
 140.  Hollowell, supra note 128, at 66. This same concern has been echoed by 
artists, who worried that “tourists might assume anything sold without a Silver 
Hand is not Native made,” which would “be unfair to artists who [had not] 
registered for the program.” Id. at 67. 
 141.  Id. See also Molly Torsen, Intellectual Property and Traditional Cultural 
Expressions: A Synopsis of Current Issues, 3 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 199, 
212 (2008) (“These mechanisms are not fool-proof; however, the Alaska State 
employee who heads the Silver Hand program indicated that the Silver Hand 
tags have been reported counterfeited and sold to non-Natives for profit.”). 
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artisans.142 Official discourse has shifted from protecting consumers to 
protecting Alaska Native artists.143 Most recently, blood quantum 
requirements were removed; now only citizenship in Alaska and 
membership in an Alaska Native tribe are required.144 The bill also 
replaced provisions that required the use of natural, traditional 
materials, with a broadened definition of “work of art” that essentially 
encompasses traditional and contemporary Alaska Native works.145 Of 
course, such an authentication program is effective only if consumers 
understand the meaning and importance of the Silver Hand program, so 
consumer education efforts, coupled with increased adoption of the 
symbol by artisans, are necessary for its functioning. 
The Silver Hand program, as noted above, essentially creates a 
trademark to identify Alaska Native-produced goods. In this sense, the 
intellectual property system promotes improvement for Alaska Native 
artisans’ economic situations. Importantly, however, the Silver Hand 
mark protects only the designation of origin. It does not prohibit or in 
any way impact the use of Native symbols, imagery, and art forms by 
non-Native craftsmen. The Silver Hand program thus does not prohibit 
the use of this cultural property by non-Natives, which may be an 
unsatisfactory solution for Alaska Native groups concerned about the 
use of their intellectual property. 
B. NAGPRA and the Recognition of Collective Rights 
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
(“NAGPRA)”146 explicitly recognized tribal interests by facilitating the 
return to tribal possession of human remains, sacred objects, and 
cultural patrimony.147 Congress enacted NAGPRA in response to issues 
 
 142.  Hollowell, supra note 128, at 75 (“In spite of all its problems, the Silver 
Hand is considered one of the best Native arts authentication programs in the 
United States. The geometric growth in artisans who have registered to use the 
emblem over the past five years attests that Native artists value its use, whether 
for material or symbolic reasons.”). 
 143.  See id. (“In general, the wider the use of the Silver Hand by artisans and 
retailers, the more protection it provides to both consumers and Native artists.”). 
 144.  S.B. 97, 25th Legislature, 25th Sess. (Alaska 2008) (considering 
identification seals on items created by Alaska Natives). The legislation 
previously required the artist to be at least one-quarter “Indian, Aleut, or 
Eskimo.” Id. Eliminating this requirement will allow Alaska Native tribes to use 
their own requirements for membership as the basis of Silver Hand eligibility. 
 145.  See ALASKA STAT. § 45.65.070(9) (2012) (“‘work of art’ means a creation or 
crafting of . . . traditional Alaska Native materials, including ivory, bone, grass, 
baleen, animal skins, wood, furs . . . .”). 
 146.  25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013 (2012). 
 147.  § 3001. This goal is evidenced, for instance, in the definition of cultural 
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that surfaced in Chilkat, providing tribes with a mechanism to facilitate 
the return of objects taken from the tribe without permission.148 
NAGPRA focuses solely on sacred communal property.149 Transactions 
involving these protected objects are presumptively invalid, because the 
objects are presumed to be inalienable and owned by tribes as 
communal property.150 NAGPRA’s proceedings also focus on tribal 
action: NAGPRA requires museums and other institutions to inventory 
their Native American holdings, and make this inventory available to 
tribes.151 Tribes may make requests for the repatriation of cultural 
property, after which the museums must transfer the materials back to 
the tribe. Individual members may not invoke NAGPRA and may not be 
the recipients of tribal property.152 
Because NAGPRA provides a comprehensive framework for the 
repatriation of Native American artifacts, some scholars have hailed the 
statute as a “core piece of human rights legislation.”153 Other scholars, 
however, were originally concerned about how NAGPRA would impact 
museums and the public domain.154 Instead, NAGPRA did not have the 
effect that its strong language would indicate; despite provisions 
mandating compliance, the University of California, Berkeley’s Phoebe 
 
patrimony: “‘cultural patrimony’ [] shall mean an object having ongoing 
historical, traditional, or cultural importance central to the Native American 
group or culture itself, rather than property owned by an individual Native 
American.” § 3001(3)(D) (emphasis added). 
 148.  H.R. REP. NO. 877, at 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4368, 
1990 WL 200613 (“The Act also sets up a process by which Federal agencies and 
museums receiving federal funds will inventory holdings of such remains and 
objects and work with appropriate Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian 
organizations to reach agreement on repatriation or other disposition of these 
remains and objects.”). 
 149.  Id. (“The purpose of [NAGPRA] is to protect Native American burial 
sites and the removal of human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and 
objects of cultural patrimony on Federal, Indian and Native Hawaiian lands.”). 
 150.  25 U.S.C. § 3002. See also Riley, supra note 75 at 213–14 (“These objects 
fall within the category of ‘cultural patrimony,’ and are presumed to be 
communally owned and inalienable by individual tribal members.”). An 
exception is made, however, in the case of transactions by a governing body. § 
3002(e). 
 151.  §§ 3003, 3004 (“Each Federal agency and each museum . . . shall compile 
an inventory  . . . [and] shall provide a written summary of such objects . . . .”). 
 152.  Riley, supra note 75, at 217 (“Ownership of tribal intangible property 
would remain solely in the tribe forever, inalienable by individual tribal 
members.”). 
 153.  Kristin Carpenter, Sonia Katyal & Angela Riley, In Defense of Property, 
118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1089 (2009) (citing Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The 
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative 
History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 39 (1992)). 
 154.  See id. at 1094–97 (discussing and responding to critics of NAGPRA). 
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A. Hearst Museum of Anthropology continues to resist repatriating the 
remains of thousands of Native Americans.155 NAGPRA also does not 
apply to non-federal institutions such as art dealers and private 
collectors.156 
NAGPRA has the potential, through its provisions about cultural 
patrimony, to help tribes in intellectual property disputes. Through 
NAGPRA, tribes may seek the return of sacred objects and their removal 
from public display.  Limiting the public display of objects allows tribes 
to obtain an analogue of trade secret protection.157 Preventing the 
dissemination of cultural patrimony allows the tribes to obtain 
essentially perpetual protection. However, once objects enter the public 
domain, they cannot leave, absent specific legislation to the contrary.158 
Thus, in the case of objects of cultural patrimony, such as crest symbols 
that have already entered the public domain through distribution and 
replication, tribes have no remedy under NAGPRA or trade secret law 
against imitators. 
Both the Silver Hand program and NAGPRA provide intellectual 
property-like tools to tribes. Serving a trademark purpose, the Silver 
Hand program seeks to prevent the passing off of non-Native-made 
goods as Native arts and crafts. NAGPRA allows tribes a greater degree 
of control over their artifacts and cultural patrimony, which would 
otherwise be free for the taking. Unfortunately, both NAGPRA and the 
Silver Hand program provide Alaska Natives with only limited 
remedies. 
V. SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
This Section provides a variety of scenarios that illustrate different 
 
 155.  Id. at 1097 (“[R]emains of some twelve thousand American Indians [are] 
currently stored in archives beneath the Hearst Gymnasium swimming pool.”). 
 156.  Kelley, supra note 123, at 197 (“For example, NAGPRA has been 
described as ‘under-inclusive in its application . . . [because] [n]on-federal 
institutions such as art auction houses, dealers and private collectors are not 
bound by the Act.’”). 
 157.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995) (“A 
trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation of a business or 
other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or 
potential economic advantage over others.”). Trade secret protection is under 
state law. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b) (2012) (defining trade secret law in 
Alaska). 
 158.  See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
restoring copyright to foreign works which had entered the public domain for 
failure to comply with American copyright’s pre-1976 formalities was 
permissible because there was a “rational basis” for the legislation, chiefly to 
bring the United States into compliance with the Berne Convention). 
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solutions to the inevitably enduring discussion of Alaska Native cultural 
property. Notably, none of these cases were decided using intellectual 
property law. 
A. “Tlingit Barbie” Revisited 
 Although “Tlingit Barbie”159 may have raised eyebrows among 
consumers, her introduction did not raise tensions with the Tlingit tribe. 
On the contrary, Mattel developed this doll, aimed at the collectors’ 
market, in collaboration with the Sealaska Heritage Institute and with 
the support of tribal leaders. The doll reflects some concessions to 
Mattel’s marketing concerns, such as the choice of colors, but otherwise 
imitates the look and feel of Tlingit design.160 “Tlingit Barbie” provides 
an example of constructive cultural collaboration between Alaska 
Natives and non-Natives. Working in an advisory role, the Sealaska 
Heritage Institute provided input on the doll’s presentation. 
Such partnerships could represent an option for Alaska Natives 
frustrated with the production and marketing of non-Native souvenirs; 
by working with outside manufacturers, tribes could license particular 
styles and images, and also provide guidance (or refuse to provide 
information) on what sacred images they do not want to see adorning 
souvenirs. While the goods would no longer be produced by Alaska 
Natives, and thus would not qualify for the Silver Hand program, a 
licensing arrangement could still prove beneficial. A particular 
trademark, similar to the Silver Hand, could be developed to identify 
these “Native-advised” goods, with percentages of the proceeds of their 
sale going to the tribes. However, creating another trademark may lead 
to consumer confusion, as is already true of the Silver Hand and its 
widespread imitation. Additionally, this solution does not address the 
displacement of Alaska Native carvings and other crafts resulting from 
the availability of cheaper knockoffs. 
B. The Sitka Totem Poles 
True to its name, Sitka’s Totem Square showcases a large totem 
pole. The pole commemorates an 1805 peace treaty between Russian 
settlers and the Tlingits, and its carvings include symbols of all parties 
 
 159.  For a description of “Tlingit Barbie,” see supra note 1 and accompanying 
text. 
 160.  Ruskin, supra note 1, at 12B. (“Of course, the earth tones on her outfit 
didn’t look right, said the dancers, who were wearing traditional red and black 
dance garb. And the designs didn’t look very Tlingit to them.”). 
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involved. The U.S. Forest Service commissioned the totem pole during 
the 1940s at the suggestion of Sitka’s Kiks.ádi clan, a Tlingit people, with 
the intent of mitigating local unemployment.161 Controversially, the 
work was assigned not to the Kiks.ádi, but rather to workers with the 
Civilian Conservation Corps.162 Further angering locals, the top figure 
on the totem pole, a representation of Aleksandr Baranov, then-
governor of Russian America, appears to be naked.163 This unflattering 
depiction has the effect of making the pole seem, to some viewers, like a 
shame pole, a special category of totem pole carved to ridicule their 
subject.164 Even as soon as the totem pole was unveiled, Native leaders 
expressed concern that this depiction would have the effect of 
“dishonoring the great man who was in charge at the time of war and 
[peace].”165 
The Sitka Totem pole has proven controversial because, aside from 
the original suggestion, tribal leaders had little input in its 
construction.166 In some Natives’ view, the government paid non-
Natives to carve in a style imbued with deep meaning, the results 
conveyed a message contrary to local sentiment, and the totem pole was 
placed on prominent display. 
By contrast, the federal government avoided many of these 
mistakes with a recently constructed totem pole, commissioned by the 
Census Bureau to boost awareness and encourage participation in the 
2010 Census.167 Featuring symbols of the two Tlingit moieties, the Eagle 
 
 161.  Anne Sutton, Top Man on Totem Pole Could Get His Clothes Back, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 8, 2008, http://www.adn.com/2008/06/08/v-
printer/430035/top-man-on-totem-pole-could-get.html (“The pole was a project 
of the Civilian Conservation Corps, a work program that was part of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal.’ It was launched during the Depression to put people to 
work.”). 
   162.  See id. (“In Southeast Alaska, Civilian Conservation Corps jobs included 
the carving and repair of totem poles.”). 
 163.  Id. (“Hope wrote that the pole did not represent the true story of the 
peace treaty, noting that Baranov was placed at the top of the pole ‘naket, 
dishonoring the great man who was in charge at the time of war and pease 
[sic].’”). 
 164.  Id. (“‘The local Tlingit community didn’t want that to happen to 
Baranov,’ he said. ‘They wanted to make peace, but the Wrangell carver carved 
him naked and that was kind of a shameful thing to do.’”). 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  See Ed Ronco, Controversial Totem Pole Returns to Sitka Square, KCAW 
(Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.kcaw.org/2011/11/28/controversial-totem-pole-
returns-to-sitka-square/ (“Designed by George Benson in the early 1940s, the 
pole was actually carved in Wrangell by workers with the Civilian Conservation 
Corps. That caused some hard feelings among the locals.”). 
 167.  Shannon Haugland, Sitka Totem Pole Adds Stature to U.S. Census, SITKA 
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and the Raven,168 the totem pole was constructed by a local Native 
carver, Tommy Joseph.169 By consulting with tribes and employing an 
Alaska Native to direct the project, the Census Bureau avoided 
offending the Alaska Natives, while also using awareness of totem 
poles’ significance to heighten visibility of the Census. 
C. Contemporary Alaska Native Artists, Appropriation Art, and 
Remix Culture 
Several contemporary Alaska Native artists, including Donny 
Varnell, Nicholas Galanin, Da-ka-xeen Mehner, and Stephen Jackson, 
are actively developing styles that blend traditional motifs and imagery 
with modern influences.170 In 2005, Donny Varnell, a carver who is part 
Haida, created some controversy when he unveiled plans for a 
commissioned totem pole that featured Japanese manga-style figures.171 
After some discussion with community members, Varnell modified his 
design slightly, but still maintained the basic stylistic ideas, hoping to 
both appeal to and inspire young students.172 
Appropriation art is nothing new, and has generally prevailed in 
court challenges.173 Thus far, none of these artists have faced legal 
challenges, but their provocative work has sparked some dialogue about 
the changing roles of artists in Alaska Native communities. Whether 
tribes will object to, and mount legal challenges to block, the use of their 
traditional imagery in non-traditional media remains to be seen. Tribes 
may even benefit from the enhanced exposure which could result.  
 
SENTINEL, Feb. 21, 2010, available at http://www.adn.com/2010/03/06/v-
printer/1171521/sitka-carvers-totem-pole-adds.html. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. (“Sitka carver Tommy Joseph completed the pole in 15 days, and it 
had its first public viewing atop a truck in Tuesday’s Elizabeth Peratrovich day 
parade down Lincoln Street.”); see also Tommy Joseph, ALASKA NATIVE ARTISTS, 
http://www.alaskanativeartists.com/tommy_joseph.htm (last accessed Oct. 5, 
2012) (including under recent pole commissions, “20-foot pole for Shee Atika 
Inc., Sitka”). 
 170.  Aldona Jonaitis, A Generation of Innovators in Southeast Alaska, 33 AM. 
IND. ART MAGAZINE 56–67 (2008). 
 171.  Peter Porco, Southeast Carver Combines Influences to Inspire Elementary 
Students, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 31, 2005, available at http:// 
juneauempire.com /stories/103105/sta_20051031010.shtml. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding 
artist’s use of a photograph was fair use). But see Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 
313–14 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that copying imagery and entering into direct 
competition with the original is not a fair use but rather infringement). 
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D. The Return of Alutiiq Songs 
Among colonization’s many negative impacts, cultural suppression 
has proven to be one of the most enduring and damaging. For instance, 
by creating a Roman-based alphabet for the Vietnamese language, the 
French suppressed the traditional Vietnamese script, effectively cutting 
off the Vietnamese people from a great body of historical culture.174 The 
colonial legacy in Alaska has had similar effects on Alaska Native tribes. 
During the Russian period, a number of Alutiiq songs and dances were 
lost outright.175 Through the loss of their cultural patrimony, the Alutiq 
lost this connection to their heritage. 
Well over a hundred years later, however, the Tlingit continued to 
sing these songs. A member of the Kiks.ádi clan of the Tlingit married 
an Alutiiq woman in Kodiak and learned the songs while living in the 
Alutiiq community.176 After his wife’s death, the man returned to his 
clan in Sitka, where he taught the songs to his community.177 
Amazingly, despite minor changes and all the years, the songs remained 
understandable to the Alutiiq.178 In a June 2010 festival, members of the 
two tribes gathered in Sitka, where the Kiks.ádi taught the five songs to 
the Alutiiq, formally presenting the Alutiiq with a piece of their cultural 
heritage.179 
This event illustrates the potential for tribal collaboration in 
protecting cultural history. Rather than pursuing any kind of legal 
claims against the Tlingit for copying their songs, the Alutiiq were able 
to strengthen a bond with the Tlingit. Recounting the episode, Steve 
Henrikson, curator at the Alaska State Museum commented, 
“sometimes the only reason things survive is because they are stolen.”180 
 
 174.  PAMELA A. PEARS, REMNANTS OF EMPIRE IN ALGERIA AND VIETNAM: 
WOMEN, WORDS, AND WAR 18 (2004) (“However, Gail Kelly points out that the 
reformed script of the Vietnamese alphabet, Quoc-Ngu, instituted by the French, 
effectively separated ensuing generations of Vietnamese students from their 
own national literature, because they could no longer read it.”). 
 175.  Dusty Kidd, Alutiiq & Tlingit Cultural Sharing 2010, U.S. NAT’L PARK 
SERV. (June 25, 2010), http://www.nps.gov/sitk/2010-june-cultural-
sharing.htm. 
 176.  Alutiiq Songs Return, ALUTIIQ MUS., http://alutiiqmuseum.org/exhibits 
/electronic-exhibits/5 (last accessed Oct. 7, 2012). 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Telephone interview with Steve Henrikson, Curator, Alaska State 
Museum (Nov. 23, 2011). 
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CONCLUSION 
Because Alaska Native works will typically fail to satisfy copyright 
protection’s threshold requirements, they will generally be unprotected 
by intellectual property laws. This leads to several possible conclusions. 
Some parties seek to confer copyright protection onto indigenous 
cultural property by lessening the restrictive requirements of copyright 
law. Accordingly, some scholars have called for the establishment of 
self-contained sui generis statutory schemes to provide an exception to 
an otherwise default rule. While adapting intellectual property laws to 
better accommodate indigenous interests could yield results going 
forward, this may prove difficult to implement. Furthermore, the 
constitutionality of removing material from the public domain has been 
challenged,181 so retroactive application of any broadened intellectual 
property laws would likely draw constitutional scrutiny. 
An alternative approach, which this Note cautiously advocates, is 
to preserve what is essentially the status quo. Some evidence suggests 
that greater copyright protection does not necessarily incentivize 
production.182 Alaska Natives can seek to avail themselves of other 
remedies, like NAGPRA, and programs such as the Silver Hand, to 
monitor and protect the use of sacred imagery and traditional styles. The 
presented case studies highlight the lack of litigation resulting from the 
use of Alaska Native artwork. Instead, and particularly important in an 
age of remix culture, Tlingit Barbie and the contemporary artists 
illustrate the benefits of collaboration and discussion. 
In order to effectuate a rebirth of Native arts and culture, it may be 
better to allow access to the bulk of cultural property, reserving only the 
sacred elements through trade secret-like protection. 
 
 
 181.  See Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1082 (10th Cir. 2010) (challenging a 
provision that restored copyright protection to foreign works that had fallen into 
the public domain), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012). 
 182.  See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, First Evaluation of 
Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of Databases 24, (Dec. 12, 2005) 
(unpublished working paper) (available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/evaluation_re
port_en.pdf) (“The second problem with the ‘sui generis’ right is that its 
economic impact on database production is unproven. Introduced to stimulate 
the growth of databases in Europe, the new instrument has had no proven 
impact on the production of databases.”). 
